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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLAINE L. PETTINGILL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
RAY B. PERKINS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF· 
STATE~1:ENT OF· FACTS 
Case No. 
8077 
Appellant's State1nent of Facts is a prolonged 
resume of all the evidence produced at the trial, includ-
ing irrelevant and conflicting testin1ony, is replete with 
inaccuracies and, in our opinion, tends to confuse rather 
than enlighten. We, therefore, prefer to make a state-
ment of the facts. 
This action was brought by the plaintiff, father of 
Keith W. Pettingill, age 26 months, deceased, who died 
as a result of an automobile-pedestrian accident on the 
22nd day of July, 1952. 
The scene of the tragedy was in front of the plain-
tiff's home at 69 North 300 East Street, Clearfield, Utah. 
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300 East Street runs North and South and is a hard 
' blacktop improved road (Tr. 13, 76) in a residential sec-
tion of Clearfield, Utah (Tr. 52). The street is about 
18 feet \vide ( Tr. 109). There are sand and dirt shoulders 
on both sides (Tr. 68). There are no sidewalks (Tr. 10). 
The plain tiff's home is on the west side of the street 
and set back fron1 the street with two lawns in front 
separated in the center by a \valk leading fro1n the front 
porch (Tr. 20). A large tree is located on each Ia,vn 
( Tr. 53). To the South of the Pettingill home was a field 
of corn stocks and vegetable garden (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"B") ( Tr. 104, -105). The Pettingill home is located 
about one-half block North of Center Street (Tr. 69). 
Center Street is one of two major East-West streets 
leading fro1n U. S. Highway #91 'vhich runs North and 
South through the center of Clearfield, Utah (Tr. 69). 
In the area i1nmediately bordering the Pettingill home, 
i.e. from Center Street to Third North Street, there were 
21 homes abutting on 300 East Street (Tr. 109). First, 
Second and Third North Streets, 'vhich run West fro1n 
300 East Street, were substantially filled up with ho1nes 
( Tr. 109). There was some conflict on the frequency of 
travel on 300 East Street, but the Plaintiff conceded that 
traffic was heavier on the street between 4 :00 and 4:45 
P.~:L than at other hours (Tr. 71) and the jury was 
justified in finding that 300 East Street was frequently 
used by motor vehicles. The accident occurred at approx-
irnately 6:25 P.l\l. on a bright, sunny day (Tr. 5). 
For approxhnately one hour prior to the accident, 
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( Tr. 11), the deceased's In other, Irene Pettingill, 'vas 
seated on the South lawn (Tr. 12, 53), facing West, with 
her back to the street (Tr. 5, 12, 47) engaged in a jig 
sR\V puzzle \Vi th her sister, Billie ~fae Harris ( Tr. 44). 
)[ r~. Pettingill was seated facing West beside the large 
tree \Vhich was on her left (Tr. 53). 
The deceased baby had been playing near the ladies 
(Tr. 1) and had then walked fro1n the West side of the 
street to the East side, \Vhere he sat in the sand shoulder 
next to the lawn seven to eight feet East of the East 
edge of the road (Tr. 6, 13) to play with Blaine Clark, 
age 4; Dennis Clark, age 6 (Tr. 6, 51); (Children of ~Irs. 
Pettingill by a former marriage) and a neighbor child, 
Roland Rich, age 6. All of the children were seated in 
the sand except Roland Rich, who \vas standing beside 
his bicycle on the la\vn (Tr. 6). When the deceased first 
crossed the road, Mrs. Pettingill saw hi1n go (Tr. 44). 
She testified that she told Dennis, age 6, "To try and 
keep an eye on his brother" ( Tr. 28). 
After playing in the sand, the child again crossed 
the road from East to West back to his mother (Tr. 49), 
where he loved and kissed her (Tr. 49). She then saw 
him cross the road West to East again (Tr. 49) where 
he again seated himself in the sand about seven to eight 
feet East of the East edge of the travel portion of the 
road (Tr. 50). She felt the child was in a safe position 
(Tr. 50). About ten to fifteen minutes later (Tr. 48), 
while the child was again crossing from East to West, the 
child was struck by the defendant's Northbound car, 
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which at this time was traveling 10 ~Iiles Per Hour 
(Jury's Answer to special interrogatory #l). Mrs. Pet-
tingill, during the ten to fifteen minutes before the acci-
dent, did not see the child (Tr. 48), and there was 
evidence from which the jury could find that the child 
had, in that time, crossed the road, carrying sand in a 
bucket, fro In East to West, emptied the bucket and 
returned from West to East (Tr. 30) (Testimony of 
Dennis Clark). 
The defendant, driving his 1935 Chevrolet auto-
Inobile, had been driving East on Center Street when he 
inadvertently passed 300 East Street (Tr. 84, 97). He 
stopped, backed up and then 1nade a left turn from the 
stopped position to go North on 300 East (TF. 97). He 
was accompanied by his wife and baby in the front seat 
(Tr. 84) and his four other children in the rear seat (Tr. 
84, 96). Neither the defendant nor his wife saw the 
deceased or the other children before the accident (Tr. 
85, 101. The defendant's first knowledge of something 
amiss was when his rear 'vheels went over something 
(Tr. 97). He stopped without leaving skid or brake 
Inarks c~rr. 75). Neither he nor his wife heard the 
in1pact ( Tr. 90, 101). 
Billie l\{ae Harris, the only eye witness to the actual 
in1pact, looked up from her seated position and screamed 
just as the car struck the child. She imn1ediately gave 
chase, as did Mrs. Pettingill. The child had been rolled 
under th·e car about 75 feet (Tr. 77). The car 'vas just 
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stopping when Mrs. Pettingill picked the child up (Tr. 
15 ). 
There 'vas a conflict in the evidence as to 'vhether 
the child was running or walking when struck. Billie 
Mae Harris, one-half to three-quarters of an hour after 
the accident, in her O\Vn hand writing, wrote on the 
officer's report that the child ran into the street. (De-
fendant's Exhibit 1) She told the Officer at the scene 
that the child ran into the road, leaning forward as he 
ran (Tr. 77). 
STAT-EMENT OF POINTS 
The respondent respectully submits six points: 
(1) The plaintiff cannot now change the theory of 
his case, or propose ne'v issues not raised in the pleadings 
or at the trial. 
(2) The negligence of the n1other was the proximate 
cause of the accident and death of her child. 
( 3) The mother of the deceased child is a benefici-
ary of the law suit and her negligence is rnaterial and a 
bar to the action of the father. 
( 4) There was no evidence that the defendant's 
negligence, if any, was the proxirnate cause of the acci-
dent. 
( 5) The last clear chance doctrine is not applicable 
in the case at bar. 
(6) The verdict of the jury and the judgment en-
tered thereon are supported by the evidence and the 
la,v. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT NOW CHANGE THE 
THEORY OF HIS CASE, OR PROPOSE NEW ISSUES NOT 
RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS OR AT THE TRIAL. 
The plaintiff now contends, in Point Two of his Brief, 
that the mother's negligence was not material. This con-
tention is in direct conflict with plaintiff's theory through-
out the entire law suit, as evidenced by the following. 
(a) Defendant's Answer contained the affir1native 
defense of contributory negligence of the mother, to which 
the plaintiff failed to reply. 
(b) Plaintiff made no motion to attack the a.ffirnla-
tive defense as imn1a.terial, either in his pleadings or 
during the trial. 
(c) Plaintiff made no objections at the time of trial 
to any questions on cross examination concerning the 
negligence of the mother. 
(d) Plain tiff requested the Court to instruct the 
jury that the negligence of the mother, if any, was a bar 
to the action, (Plaintiff's Requested Instructions lA and 
6A), and the Court granted the requests and so instruct-
ed the jury. 
(e) Plaintiff did not assign the point in his motion 
for a new trial. 
It is submitted that the plaintiff, having adopted the 
point of law in question, and having tried his law suit on 
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that theory; and having requested the Court to so in-
struct the jury, cannot now be heard to complain. 
See 3 Ant. Juris. Sec. 253 : 
"It is well settled that the theory upon which 
the case was tried in the Court below rnust be 
strictly adhered to on appeal." 
And again at Sec. 371 : 
"A party cannot for the first time on appeal 
object that the Court erred in submitting particu-
lar questions to the jury." 
And at S.ec. 379 : 
"* * * exceptions must be taken to the giving 
or refusal of instructions or charges in order to 
have the question considered on review." 
In Pa.tton v. Evans, 69 P2 969, 92 Ut. 524, it is said: 
"But since no exception was taken to the in-
structions as given, -and no request made for fur-
ther instructions and no assignment as to any 
error in giving incorrect instruction was made, 
we cannot review such instruction on that ground." 
In accord, see Carbon Co1(;nty v. Draper, 74 Utah 24, 
276 P659; Kirchgestn.er v. D & R G W, Utah, 218 P2 
685. 
The plaintiff also contends, in Point Three of his 
Brief, that defendant had the last clear chance to avoid 
the accident. 
This allegation was not made in the pleadings, there 
was no such contention made at the trial, and no request-
ed instruction to the jury on this point of law was sub-
mitted by the plaintiff. It is proposed by appellant for 
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the first ti1ne in this appeal. 
In Shea. v. P·ilette, 108 ':t. 446, 189A 154, 109 ALR 
933, the Court states : 
"It is argued that the defendant had the last 
clear chance to avoid the accident. But, since the 
( Corr1plaint) does not allege facts which gave rise 
to a duty in this respect, and it does not appear 
that the issue 'vas made below, this theory is not 
for our consideration." 
In Evans v. Sha.nd, 74 Utah 451, 280 P. 239, the 
Court states at Page 240: 
"The appellant* * *asserts that the respond-
ent is bound by the theory of his allegations and 
of the findings and may not now, on appeal from 
the judgment founded thereon, depart therefrom. 
We think the contention is well founded. The rule 
is well settled that on an appeal the parties are re-
stricted to the theory on which the case was prose-
cuted or defended in the Court below. 3 C.J. 718; 
2 R.C.L. 79; In re Beason's Estate, 49 Utah 24, 
161 P. 678. That is especially true as to the theory 
accorded a pleading in the Court below which, 
on appeal, 1nust be adhered to and cannot be 
shifted. Certainly, on appeal, th.e pleadings can-
not be enlarged * * * on a theory upon which the 
complaint was not fotttnded nor the case tried", 
etc. 
It is therefore submitted, as elementary, that to per-
mit an appellant to raise new issues in the Supreme Court 
would be a sanctioning of unfairness to the lower Court 
and the opposing party; an overruling of the orderly 
administration of justice; an approval of delay and ex-
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pense to litigants; and an affir1nance by this Court of a 
rule that the termination of litigation shall not be fore-
seeable. 
The plaintiff by his actions below has waived his 
right to complain and is estopped no\v from doing so. 
See 3 An1. Juris., Sec. 246. 
POINT TWO 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE MOTHER WAS THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND DEATH OF 
HER CHILD. 
The jury had over,vhelming testimony fro1n which 
to properly conclude that the deceased's mother was 
negligent. In our opinion, the Lower Court should have 
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the 
ground that she was negligent as a matter of law. 
It is undisputed in the testimony that the mother, 
shortly before the accident, knowingly permitted the 
baby to cross the street on three occasions, and that the 
child was struck while he was crossing the street the 
fourth time. Considering the very tender age of the 
child, the nature of the street and the thickly populated 
residential section, the mother's conduct in this regard 
was, in our opinion, gross negligence. 
Prior to the accident, she was seated on the lawn 
with her back to the road, \vith a tree im1nedia.tely to her 
left, and a field of high corn stalks further to her left 
(South), and she could not possibly have seen a car ap-
proach from the South, had she looked. And in this 
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position, she pern1itted a 26 months old child to play on 
the opposite side of the street from her, where she would 
have been helpless to protect the child had she seen him 
get up and start for the road. That, again, is negligence 
as a matter of law. 
The Inother was engaged in a jig saw puzzle which 
obviously had captured her attention, as evidenced by the 
fact that she neither saw nor heard the defendant's car 
approaching and did not know the accident had happened 
until her sister screa1ned. She was not only failing to 
keep a proper lookout; she 'vas keeping no lookout at all. 
She was, in this respect also, guilty of negligence as a 
1natter of law. 
She atte1npted to justify her actions by testifying 
that she had instructed her six year old child to "try and 
keep an eye on him." Even if that be true, she was negli-
gent in entrusting the baby's care to a child not old 
enough to realize or appreciate danger himself. 
~Irs. Pettingill 1nust have known, and by law is 
chargeable with knowing, that a 26 n1onths old baby can-
not be relied upon to remain in one place for very long; 
that his actions are unpredictable; that the child has no 
appreciation of dangerous situations and is incapable and 
cannot be expected to 'vatch for vehicles on the road. 
In Barker v. Sa,vas, 52 Utah 262, 172 Pac. 672 (cited 
by Appellant) the facts are clearly distinguishable. There 
the six year old child was riding a tricycle on the edge of 
the highway, in a proper position thereon, and travelling 
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1n a correct direction 'vhen struck fro1n behind by the 
defendant's truck. The child in the case at bar \Vas not 
playing on the high,vay, but \Vas seated 7 to 8 feet off 
the edge of the highway before it ju1nped up and ran into 
the path of the defendant's car. 
In Vinnette v. Northern Pacific Ry., 47 Wash. 320, 
91 Pac. 975, a child, six years of age, was pern1itted by 
its mother to cross some railroad tracks while she kept a 
lookout. However, upon the child's return, it was struck 
by a train and killed. The train crew never saw the child. 
The Court states : 
"* * * the facts are that respondent's wife, 
\vith whom he left the child, assented to her going 
across the tracks unattended; that the Mother 
watched her while leaving; that she \Vas per1nitted 
to return alone; and that while doing so she was 
struck by the train before any of the switching 
crew saw her or knew of her presence. The acts 
of the parents constitute the most flagrant negli-
gence upon their part. They 1nust have known 
that the very existence of the railroad tracks was 
itself a sign of danger; that an unattended child, 
only six years of age, should not have been per-
mitted to play upon or near them." * * * "Parents 
cannot delegate to trainmen or to other persons 
in charge of dangerous agencies the care and pro-
tection of their unattended children." 
The Court also quotes with favor in the above de-
cision as follows: 
"To suffer a child to warnder in the street has 
the sense of p,ermit. If such permission of suffer-
ance exist, it is negligence." 
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POINT THREE 
THE 1\IOTHER OF THE DECEASED CHILD IS A BENE-
FICIARY OF THE LAW SUIT AND HER NEGLIGENCE 
IS MATERIAL AND A BAR TO THE ACTION OF THE 
FATHER. 
The mother's interest in this law suit, as in all 
other Inatters pertaining to the n1inor child1 en, is equal 
to that of the father, as clearly evidenced from the follow-
ing Statutes of this State : 
75-13-18, U.C.A., 1953 
•'Husband and wife living together are joint 
guardians of their minor children, with equal 
powers, rights and duties with respect to the con-
trol and custody and the services arnd earnings of 
their minor children; and neither husband nor 
wife has any right paramount to that of the other 
\vith respect to the custody and control of or to 
the earnings of their minor children." 
74-4-5 (3), U.C.A., 1953 
"* * * if the decedent leaves no issue or hus-
band or wife, the estate must go to his father and 
mother in equal shares, and if either is dead, then 
to the other." 
30-1-9, U.C.A., 1953, which provides that a minor may 
not 1narry without the consent, in writing, of the father 
or n1other. 
30-2-9, U.C.A., 1953 
•'The expenses of the family and the education 
of the children are chargeable upon the property 
of both husband and wife or of either of them, and 
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in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or 
separately." 
So that, in the case at bar, the mother is equally 
liable for the medical and funeral expenses incidental 
to the c.are and burial of the deceased. 
It is therefore submitted that it would be anomalous 
and contrary to the obvious legislative intent, as clearly 
indicated by the above Statutes, to hold that the mother 
'vould have no interest in the recovery had from this law 
suit, had the plaintiff been successful and recovered dam-
ages. 
If such were the law, a n1other, under a decree of di-
vorce or separate maintenance providing her with the 
custody of the child, would have no recourse whatsoever 
should her child be negligently killed, but the father could 
recover substantial damages and keep the entire proceeds 
for himself. This, although from a practical and humane 
standpoint, the mother's loss could conceivably be n1uch 
greater than the father's. 
The Supreme Court of this State, although we can 
find no decision squarely ruling on the subject, has by 
clear and unequivocal language, upheld the conclusion 
that the question of the mother's negligence is material. 
In Barker v. Savas, 52 Utah 262, 172 Pac. 672, (Cited 
by _:\ppellant), the Court, after spending considerable 
time reviewing the actions of the Inother prior to the acci-
dent, states: 
"Neither was there any negligence on the 
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part of the mother." 
In Hyde v. Union Pac. Ry., 7 Utah 356, 26 P 979, 
decided June 5, 1891, plaintiff (father) sued for the death 
of a four to five year old child "rho had gone to sleep on 
the railroad tracks and was killed by a train. The acci-
dent occurred on a clear J-uly day, at noon. The engi-
neer and fireman saw the child but thought it was a rag. 
The Supreme Court upheld the Lower Court instruc-
tion, which, on the question of damages, was as follows 
in part, at Page 980: 
"* * * and takes in to consideration the assist-
ance that it (child) might be to the parents in fu-
ture years; * * * the comfort that the parents 
might take * * * the reliance that they could take 
* * * for future years for their support * * * in 
determining what they should receive," etc. 
'l,he Supreme Court states at Page 981: 
"The questions of the negligence of the par-
ents and of the railroad company were submitted 
to the jury * * * and we see no reason to disturb 
their verdict * * * But even if the pa.rents were 
(negligent) we think under the circumstances of 
this case such negligence should not defeat a re-
covery." 
The Court then holds that the facts constituted a 
situation where the last clear chance doctrine was applic-
able. 
In Corbett v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 25 
Utah 449, 71 P. 1065 (decided April 1, 1903), plaintiff 
(father) brought the action for the death of his two year 
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and three n1onth old child, 'vhich 'vas killed on a railroad 
track at ~fammoth, Utah. At Page 1066, in discussing 
the lower Court's refusal to give an instruction concern-
ing the contributory negligence of "the parents, or either 
of then1", states at Page 1066 : 
"It 'vas not error to refuse this request for 
the reasons ( 1) There was no evidence of contri-
butory negligence, of the parents, or either of 
them," etc. 
In Parmley v. Plea.sant Valley Coal Co., 64 Utah 
125, 228 P 557, decided August 8, 1924, the Court upholds 
the obviously sound and universally held ruling that the 
person design a ted to bring the wrongful death action 
does so on behalf of all the heirs, in order to avoid a 
n1ultiplicity of suits. 
In that case, the mother of a posthumous child 
brought suit for the death of the father. The mother 
(wife) had previously filed suit and settled the suit by 
confession of judgment. At Page 560 the Court states: 
"Under the ter1ns of the Statute we think no 
one will deny that if a personal representative 
brings the action all the heirs are bound. F·or the 
very same reason all are bound if one or more 
of the heirs bring it, because in either event the 
action is prosecuted for the benefit of all the 
heirs. * * * 
"As we have seen, that has always been the 
·construction placed upon the Statute as originally 
adopted, and the legislature, in naming another 
person who may sue, took the precaution of again 
making it clear that nevertheless but one action 
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can be maintained regardless of who brings the ac-
tion and that such an action is for the benefit of 
all the heirs." 
The Court also states at Page 562: 
"If da1nages are recovered, each heir is en-
titled to his proportionate share, whether he was 
a party to the action or not, and, if his share is 
\vithheld from hin1 he may always sustain an ac-
tion against his coheirs for contribution." 
Appellant's counsel cites the Annotation in 2 ALR 2 
785 and the Annotator's conclusion at Page 805 that the 
great \veight of authority does not impute the negligence 
of one spouse to the other unless there is a true agency 
relationship in the facts. Counsel also recites, in POINT 
2 of his Brief, that there is no agency relationship be-
tween husband and \vife merely because of the marriage 
contract. These propositions, however, are neither ap-
plicable nor controlling in the case at bar. 
The n1other's negligence is n1aterial and a bar to the 
action in this State, not because of agency and imputed 
negligence but because she is a beneficiary of the law 
suit. In all respects she is a co-plaintiff, and the la\v 
\vill not per1nit a person to recover damages, either fully 
or partially, where those damages resulted from the con-
tributory negligence of that person. 
As clearly indicated in the 2 ALR 2 Annotation 
(supra), there is a 'vide variance in the results of the 
decisions from the various states on the effect of the con-
tributory negligence of the beneficiary not a party to the 
law suit. This is understandable because of the divergen~ 
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types of \Vrongful death Statutes and, in the 1nain, the 
decisions can be rationalized by exa1nining the Statutes 
being interpreted by the various Courts. 
If the Statute in question provides that the ca u~e 
of action sttrvives the injured person's death, then of 
course the contributory negligence of the deceased is 
the only bar to the action. In these jurisdiction~, there-
fore, the negligence of a beneficiary is i1n1naterial. See 
Wymore v. ~lahaska, 78 Iowa 396, .J-:3 N.\V. 264; lT'iln1ot v. 
J.llcPadden, 78 Conn. 276, 61A. 1069; Lot;e 'O. Detroit R,11., 
170 l\Iich. 1, 135 NvV 963; Nash rille Lunzber Co. r. Bus-
bee, 100 Ark. 76, 139 SW 301; 2 AI_.jR2 at 811. 
The Utah Court, in Halling v. Ind. Ace. CoJJI1n., 71 
Utah 112, 263 P. 78, at Page 118, states: 
"It (The Wrongful Death Statute) does not 
revive or continue the action of the deceased", and 
held that the action is a ne\v cause of action. 
See also Morrision v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P2 
772. 
So also, in co1nmunity property states, sorne Courts 
hold that the 1nother, in caring for the child, is acting 
for the com1nunity and her negligence is i1nputed to the 
father under the agency theory. 
See Agdeppa v. Glougie, 162 P2 944, 71 Cal. App. 2 
~63. Ostheller v. Spokane and I.E.R. Co. (1915) 107 
Wash. 678, 182 P 630, 2 ALR 2 at 808. 
So that if the Wrongful Death Statute is punit-ive 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
in nature, the contributory negligence of a beneficiary 
is i.nuna.teria.l, as the la'v seeks only to punish the wrong~ 
doer for his negligence. 
See Ilerrell v. St. Louis F. R. Co. C~Iissouri) 23 SW 2 
102, 69 ALR 470; O'Conn.el v. Ben.son Coal Co., 301 Mass. 
145, 16 NE2 636; Southern Railway Co. v. Skipp, 169 
.r\la. 327, 53 So. 150; 2 ALR 2 at Page 811. 
The Utah Court in Morrison v. Perry (supra) 104 
Utah 151, 140 P2 772, states: 
"The law does not seek to punish the wrong 
doer, but simply to contpensate the heirs." 
And again, as in Colorado, where the Statute (Gen. 
l.Jaws 1877, P 343) gave the cause of action to the father 
and ntother, and the Code of the State provided that an 
action for death of a child 1night be brought by the father, 
or in case of his death or desertion of his family, by the 
Inother (san1e as TJtah) the Supreme Court in Phillips v. 
Denver Tra1nwa.y, 53 Colo. 458, 128 P. 460 at Page 464, 
states: 
"Construing the act of 1877 and the Code 
provision together, this Court has held that such 
an action may be brought by the father alone or by 
the father and mother, and that while the mother 
was a proper party she was not a necessary one. 
If not joined in the action, the mother might apply 
to be made a party and such application should be 
granted for the purpose of protecting her interest 
* * * for, under the Statute, the mother has an 
equal interest in the judgment with the father 
* * *" 
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At Page 466: 
"Each of the parties here (under the Statute) 
have a half interest, and it \vould be an easy Inat-
ter for the jury, under proper instructions and in-
terrogatories, in case they find the father to be 
guilty of such contributory negligence as \Vould 
defeat his recovery, to ascertain the a1nount that 
should be given to the mother * * * ." 
In accord, see L.A. & S.L. Ry. D. Ur;nbatt_(Jh, 61 Ne-
vada 214, 123 P2 224 (Construing the Nevada Statute, 
which reads) : 
~'The father and mother jointly, or the father 
or the mother without preference to either * * *" 
may bring the action. 
And, finally, in those jurisdictions wherein the Stat-
ute gives the cause of action to the Estate, through a per-
sonal representative, administrator or ax.ecutor, 1nany 
Courts hold that the negligent beneficiary does not bene-
fit directly fron1 the law suit, but only indirectly through 
distribution of the estate and that the beneficiary's 
negligence is not therefore material. 
See 2 ALR 2 at Page 795 (Sec. 4) and cases therein 
cited. 
But in re. Behm' s Esta,te, ______ Utah ______ , 213 P2 657, 
this Court held that the proceeds of a Wrongful Death 
action are not assets of the estate and upheld the follo\v-
ing from Morrison v. Perry (supra): 
"* * * the estate is separate and distinct front 
the plaintiff or the statutory beneficiaries in this 
action." 
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It is, therefore, understandable that the Restatement 
of the I_Ja'v of Torts, Sec. 493, provides: 
"The effect of the contributing negligence of 
a beneficiary under a Death Statute depends upon 
the provisions of the Statute." 
The Utah Death Statute, 78-11-6, U. C. A., 1953, 
stands almost alone in comparison to the Statutes of the 
other jurisdictions. 
The Arizona VVrongful Death Statute, Ch. 18, Sec. 
945, Revised Code of Arizona, 1928, contains the same 
wording as the Utah Statute. 
In Flagstaff v. Gomez) 23 Ariz. 184, 202 P 401, 23 
ALR 661, a fifteen month old child fell into a street ex-
cavation and was drowned. The father, under the Stat-
ute, brought suit against the City of Flagstaff. The Low-
er Court refused the defendant's motion to amend its 
ans\ver at the time of trial to include the defense of con-
tributory negligence of the parent. \T erdict in the Lower 
Court \vas a\varded the plaintiff, and, on appeal, the 
Supreme Court states: 
"The reasons for the rule (a parent's negli-
gence is not i1nputed to a child in a suit for in-
juries to the child) fail where the action, though 
nominally for the benefit of the estate, is in real-
ity in the interests of the beneficiary, whose neg-
ligence contributed to the accident resulting in the 
death. To deny the defense of imputed negligence 
\Vhere this is true would be the equivalent of per-
mitting one to profit by his own wrong." 
"(The parents) are the sole heirs of their fif-
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teen 1non th old child. rrhe Appellants should have 
been permitted to place before the jury their de-
fense of imputed negligence, for, if they had been 
allo,ved to do so, and could have persuaded the 
jury that it 'vas the proximate cause of the child's 
death, they would have been entitled to a verdict 
in their favor." 
HvVhen the action is by the parent in his o\vn 
right or for his benefit * * * the contributory neg-
ligence of the parent is a bar to the action and 
this althou-gh the action is bt·ought by one pare-nt 
ctnd the negligence ~vas that of the other." 
It is subn1itted, therefore, that the father and the 
mother 1nust succeed or fail together in this la'v suit, and 
the contributory negligence of the rnother is a bar to the 
action. This for the reason sun1rnarized by the Illinois 
Suprerne Court in II ooperton Jl;f otor Bus Conl]JaHy v. 
Hazel, 310 Ill. 38, 141 NE 392: 
"The negligence of the parents bars the ac-
tion, not because it is a failure of duty to the child, 
not because of tender considerations of the la 'v 
for conditions of infancy, not because of the iin-
puted negligence and not because no 1nan rnay 
profit by his own wrong, but because since conl-
lnon law the contributory negligence of a person 
suffering the dan1ages is a con1plete defense to the 
negligence of the person causing the injury. The 
cause of action is statutory. There is no separa-
tion of the dama.ges. The findi.ng is for a single 
gross amottnt in an insepa-rable ca-use of action 
and the contributory negligence of one beneficiary 
who may be entitled to share in the recovery is a 
defense to the action." 
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POINT FOUR 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFEND-
ANT'S NEGLIGENCE, IF ANY, WAS THE PROXIMATE 
C ... -\USE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The plaintiff produced evidence which proved only 
that a tragic accident occurred and that th·e defendant 
did not see the child before or at the time of the accident. 
There 'vas not one iota of evidence produced from which 
the jury could have properly determined that when the 
child moved from its seated position off the road into a 
position of peril, the defendant could have taken avoid-
ing action to prevent the accident, had he seen the. child 
so move. 
It is not enough to simply prove that an accident 
occurred involving the defendant. It is not enough to 
sirnply prove, what is admitte-d by the defendant, that 
the defendant failed to see the child while it was seated 
in a position off the road and therefore not in an im-
mediate position of peril. It must be proved, and it was 
ineurnbent on the plaintiff to prove, facts which would 
establish that when the child moved from its position of 
safety towards a position of peril the defendant at that 
ti .. me, as a reasonable and prudent motorist, saw, or 
should have seen the child so move, and could have then 
stopped or taken other avoiding action to prevent the 
accident. 
It is subrnitted that without such evidence the plain-
tiff's case fails as the jury cannot be allowed to guess or 
surmise on 'vhat happened at the scene. They cannot de-
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tern1ine by guesswork what distance the ear \Vas fro1n 
the child at the tin1e it stood up and 1noved to\vard the 
street. \Vithout such evidence, the jury could not pos-
sibly determine whether his failure to see the child 'vas 
the proximate cause of the accident or not, and the de-
fendant's motions for a dis1nissal of the action and for a 
directed verdict should have been granted by the lo,ver 
Court. 
In Gardner v. Tuck (Missouri) l 23 S.\V2 158, -t i\ C-
CA (NS) 506, the defendant admitted that he was driving 
35 MPH in a 25 MI>I-[ zone at night vvhen his car struck 
an eleven year old boy riding a bicycle, who1n the defend-
ant never saw before the accident, and, in fact after the 
accident, was not cognizant of vvhat his car had struck. 
The Court states: 
"It is well settled that antecedent negligence, 
in this case defendant's speed before he saw or 
should have discovered deceased in a position of 
imminent peril, cuts no figure." 
"The issues must be determined frorn the evi-
dence tending to show the conduct of the defend-
ant at the time and after the peril arose." 
The defendant 'vas travelling at a speed of 10 ~fiYH. 
Had he seen the child sea ted 7 to 8 feet off the road, he 
would have been under no legal duty to stop or to other-
wise alter his actions. The child was seated playing in the 
sand, a pastime which sometilnes occupies little children 
for hours. He had no kno,vledge, like Mrs. Pettingill, that 
the child had previously gotten up and crossed the street. 
Had he seen the child so occupied, he had the right to 
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proceed cautiously, as he 'vas doing. IIow far the car 
'vas fron1 the child 'vhen the child moved we do not know. 
Obviously it was very close, as the right front fender 
struck the ehild, which then was very near the east edge 
of the road. But actual distance is surmise, in which no 
one in justice, especially the jury, can en.gage. 
(See Richards v. Paia.ce Laulndry, 55 Utah 409, 186 
P. 439 discussed under POINT 5, infra.) 
POINT FIVE 
THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLI-
CABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. 
The Utah Supre1ne Court has, in several decisions, 
adopted the wording of the Restate1nent of the Law of 
Torts, Sections 479 and 480. We, however, refer the 
Court to Richard-s vs. Palace Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 
186 Pac. 439, wherein the decision clearly explains why 
the doctrine is not applicable in th·e fact situation here. 
There, a bicyclist, plaintiff, fell into the path of the 
defendant's opposite bound truck. It was urged that the 
defendant driver, travelling 8 to 10 MPH, could have 
stopped or turned to avoid the bicyclist under the last 
clear chance doctrine. We quote from the opinion: 
"The driver of the auto truck thus having the 
legal right to presume that the plaintiff would 
not enroach upon the driver's side of the street 
did not owe the plaintiff the duty of a constant 
lookout, and hence, to hold the deferula!nt liable in 
this action, the plaintiff, in order to· make out a 
case in law, is required to prove more than the 
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1nere fact that the auto truck could ha,ue been 
stopped or turned aside in the distance of 10 to 
15 feet." 
~'If this case were one, ho\vever, \Vhere it "~as 
the duty of the driver to Inaintain a constant look-
out, as was the case in Barker vs. Savas, (supra), 
we would, notwithstanding the uncertainty of 
plaintiff's testin1ony, feel constrained to hold that 
the question of whether the driver ought to have 
seen the plaintiff in time to have avoided the 
injury was for the jury. Under such cireuul-
stances, however, there \vould have been no pre-
sumption of a clear roadway in favor of the 
driver, as is the case here. vVhere there is SitCh 
a prestunption, the plaintiff nutst prove 'Jnore than. 
1nerely to show that if th.e driver had ntainta in ed 
a consta.nt lookout he could have discovered his 
peril in time to ha,ve avoided the accident . .... 
The burden to sho\v negligence \vas on plain tiff 
.... Is negligence sho\vn whPre nothing is n1ade 
to appear except that the driver of the vehiele \vho 
\Vas la\vfully passing on the right side of the 
street, and that in doing so caine in contact \vith 
one \Vho had intruded onto the \vrong side of the 
street, but had done so when the driver \vas still 
such a distance away that if he had 1uaintained 
a constant lookout he could have discovered the 
plaintiff and have avoided the injury? Clearly 
not .... The plaintiff 1nust prove son1e positive 
act or omission constituting negligence. . . ." 
Appellant must concede that if the last clear chance 
doctrine applies, it Inust be on the constructive discovery 
of the peril theory, as it was admitted by defendant that 
he at no time actually saw the child. 
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In 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile La"r and 
Practice, Sec. 2809, Page 405, it is said: 
"As the na1ne of the last clear chance doctrine 
iinplies, it is necessary that defendant have the 
last clear chance to avoid injuring plaintiff, or 
th.e time in which, by the exercise of reasonable 
care, he can by the use of the means at hand .... 
avoid injuring plaintiff .... The rule is that the 
last clea.r chance must be a clear one arnd reason-
ably found to be fairly given." 
And, in 38 Ainer. J urisp., Sec. 223, at Page 909, it is said: 
"Even where the doctrine (of last clear 
chance) is deemed to apply generally on the basis 
that the defendant was under a duty to discover 
the danger to the injured person, a recovery may 
be defeated upon the ground that notwithstanding 
the defendant had discovered the presence of the 
injured person, he was not bound to realize the 
danger to the latter." 
See also 119 ALR 1069. 
It is also submitted that the doctrine of constructive 
discovery under the last clear chance assumes that the 
plaintiff's negligence had ceased and was not continuing 
and concurrent with the defendant's negligence. The 
mother's negligenec most certainly continued up to the 
n1on1ent of the accident. 
In POINT THREE of Appellant's Brief, counsel 
cites Utah cases, the facts of 'vhich clearly fall within 
the constructive discovery of the peril class. For exam-
ple, Palmer vs. Oregon Short Line Ry., 34 Utah 423, 98 
Pac. 689 (child asleep on railroad tracks) ; Richa.rds vs. 
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Palace L(tundry Co., 55 Utah ~109, 186 l?ac. 439 (dis-
cussed supra); Barker vs. Savas (supra) (child riding 
tricycle on. road); IJ!ingus vs. Olsson., 114 Utah 505, 201 
P. 2d 495 (Pedestrian crossing street ahead of 1notorist); 
Leinbach vs. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 138 Kan. 56, 23 
P. 2d 449, (Collision between two vehicles); Grahanz. rs. 
Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 I->. 2d 230 (Pedestrian stand-
ing in center of road with back to n1otorist); Hyde ·vs. 
Union Pacific Ry. Co., 7 Utah 356, 26 I>. 979 (Child asleep 
on R. R·. tracks). 
In all these cases, therefore, it is apparent that the 
person injured or killed wa.s in a position of peril, and 
the law imposes on the defendant, quite properly, the 
duty to see the peril in his path. 
But in the case at bar, as we have urged in our 
POINT FOUR, had the child remained seated 7 to 8 feet 
off the road, the defendant's car would have passed 
without incident, despite the fact that the defendant did 
not see the deceased. 
In Graham vs. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 1:>. 2d at 
Page 237, where the facts 'vere that the injured pedes-
trian was standing in the center of the street \vith his 
back to the approaching Inotorist, the Court states: 
"But in the last clear chance doctrine th·e 
word 'clear' has significance. In a case such as 
this when both parties are more or less rapidly 
changing their positions the evidence Inust be 
clear and convincing that the party \Vhom it is 
claimed could have avoided the accident had a 
'clear' chance to do so." 
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And at Page 238: 
"Other,vise 've may put the onus of one's negli-
gence on a party not negligent. That party's 
negligence only arises when it is definitely estab-
lished that there was ample tim.e and opportu;n"ity 
to avoid the accident wh·ich was not taken adva.n-
tage of." 
There are innun1erable sidewalks adjacent to heavily 
travelled city streets throughout this State, 'vithin 7-8 
feet of the street. We submit that a n1otorist, travelling 
20 :NfPI-I, or twice the speed of this defendant, is under 
no duty to stop, or alter his speed, should he observe a 
child seated on that sidewalk. His duty to that child 
arises 'vhen the child moves toward the street, or towards 
a position of peril. 
Nor is the arguinent of appellant at Page 23 of his 
Brief tenable. Appellant assumes that the very identical 
moJnent that the child moved from its seated position, 
the defendant should have jammed his brakes and 
stopped-a premise that is unreal and unjust and re-
quires of the defendant foresight equal to hindsight. 
It is ele1nentary that the "reaction time" of a~th 
second n1entioned by appellant is the time required by 
the average motorist in applying his brakes, after he 
ha.s deci.ded to stop. The time required in perceiving the 
child's unexpected 1novement, realizing the danger of 
that 1notion and reacting to the danger (perception-
judginent-reaction time) can and always does consume 
~everal seconds, while the car is n1oving approximately 
15 feet per second. The testimony at the trial showed 
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that only 4 seconds elapsed \Vhile the defendant's ear 
travelled between the rose bush and the point of in1paet 
(Tr. 125). 
And further, counsel co1npletely overlooks the testi-
mony and de1nonstration to the jury concerning the blind 
area in front of all auto1nobiles and particularly the 
defendant's vehicle, caused by the dashboard, hood and 
right windshield post. At Page llG of the transcript, 
the expert, Mr. Taylor, testified that a driver of the 
defendant's vehicle, \vith the eye level height of l\lr. 
Perkins, could not see the ground for 38 feet ahead. lt 
was further den1onstrated to the jury, by 1neans of a 
large magnetic blackboard with cars to scale and a paper 
template ahead of the car, sho,ving thereon that th<> 
child, seated, would pass out of the driver's vision \vhen 
the car was a certain distance, and that the child, stand-
ing erect, 'vould pass out of a driver's vision at a lesser 
distance ,these distances being designated in &-x:act feet 
on the template. It is now unfortunate that the record 
was not better preserved. It is subn1itted, ho\vever, that 
the demonstration to the jury \Vas very clearly 1nade 
and that they were justified in finding that \vhen the 
child moved from its seated position, it was then within 
the "blind area" and could not have been seen by the 
defendant; this particularly in light \vith the officer's 
testimony that, according to Mrs. Harris, the child ran 
in a bent forward position. 
And again, appellant's counsel has ignored the facts 
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clearly brought out to the jury, that the accident occurred 
on a. hot July afternoon; that the jury could reasonably 
believe that the children 'vere playing in the deep shade 
of the Pettingill tree ; that they "\vere 1notionless and not 
active; that the jury·could and did find that the deceased, 
under those conditions, was ''camouflaged," and that it 
"-as perfectly understandable, under those conditions, 
"\\"hy the defendant and his 'vife failed to see the deceased. 
"It is a n1atter of common knowledge, if not 
universal experience, that all of us frequently 
look in a certain direction and do not see every 
object within our range of vision." Palmer vs. 
Oregon Short Line R.y. (supra). 
It is therefore submitted that the last clear chance 
doctrine cannot possibly apply in a fact situation, as in 
the case at bar, where it is clear and undisputed that the 
road\vay it~elf was clear as the motorist approached; 
'vhere plaintiff produced no evidence at all to show the 
tilue or distance present when the child moved towards 
a position of peril; where there was no evidence at all 
tending to show that the last clear chance was clearly 
and fairly given; where the negligence of the plaintiff 
(beneficiary) continued to the point of in1pact; and where 
the defendant's evidence clearly sho\ved why the child 
was not observed before it moved and could not have 
been seen by any motorist driving the defendant's car 
under the same circun1stances. 
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POINT SIX 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGlVIENT 
ENTERED THEREON ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE AND THE LAW. 
The evidence adduced at the trial hy both the plain-
tiff and the defendant \Vas suprisingly free of eonflict. 
The jury could hardly have arrived at a different verdiet 
than they did, both on the grounds that the accident \Va~ 
unavoidable on the part of the defendant and that the 
1nother's negligence \vas obviously a contributing factor 
to this sad and unfortunate accident. 
The accident \Vas unavoidable for the very reason 
that any motorist, caught under the sa1ne circum~tances, 
"\vould have been helpless, whether he had previou~ly 
seen the child in its seated position or not. Even had the 
defendant been endo,ved "\vith foresight and had broken 
the law by S\vinging wide to the left of the child and on to 
the \Vrong side of the road, it appears certain front the 
facts that the child 'vould have con1e in contact "\vith 
the car. 
To hold the defendant negligent in this in~tance 
"\vould require all n1otorists in the ~tate of Utah, upon 
seeing children on a side,valk or la\vn eight feet fron1 the 
road seated or otherwise, to i1n1nediatelv con1e to a 
' ._ 
stop. To proceed, even at 10 ~1PII, would he at the entire 
and sole risk of the 1notorist. 
The lR\V and public policy recognizes the right of a 
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n1otorist to proceed cautiously. ·They I~ecognize the need 
of free and cautious use of the public streets by motorists 
for the safe and continued movement of vehicles on the 
high,vay. 
The law recognizes an unavoidable accident, which 
this certainly was, despite the tragic consequences to 
the plaintiff and his wife. 
And if it be urged that the proposition of law, herein 
propounded by our POINT ~eHR-EE, is unjust, then the 
very nature of the marriage con tract itself is unjust. 
"For better or for worse" is not an empty phrase. The 
husband and wife succeed or fail, stand or fall together 
in the illnesses of their children; in the heartbreak of 
the death of a child, whether by illness or accident; in 
the fortunes or misfortunes of ernploy1nent or finance; 
in the "good breaks" or "bad breaks" of everyday life 
during the marriage. 
\Ve, therefore, sub1nit that the trial below and the 
verdict was fair and just, both on the evidence and the 
la\v. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
LOUIS E. MIDGLEY, 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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